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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Dramatic changes in rules governing admissibility of expert tes-
timony impact all areas of law. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Ev i-
dence and the evidence law of many states impose a requirement 
that judges admit expert testimony only if it is based on a scientifi-
cally sound foundation. Just in the past year, an explosion of litera-
ture addressed to scholars and the practicing bar has explored the 
impact of new evidence standards on such diverse areas as the law of 
toxic torts, 1 antitrust, 2 state and federal criminal law,3 trademark 
and advertising law,4 hostile work environment cases, 5 accident re-
                                                                                                                  
 * Seton Hall Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Seton Hall School of Law; 
A.B., Dartmouth College, 1972; M.A., Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State 
University, 1976; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1979; Ph.D., Economics, 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1980. The author would like to ex-
press appreciation for the contributions of Michael Risinger and Chen Bao. 
 1. See, e.g., Mandi L. Williams, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on Toxic Tort 
Class Action Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181 (2003). 
 2. See, e.g., Maura L. Hughes, Challenging Expert Witness Testimony in Antitrust 
Cases: Lessons from Recent Rulings Applying Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., in ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials: Trying and Winning a Civil Antitrust Case 
(SH045), Dec. 12-13, 2002, at 339. 
 3. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of 
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339 
(2002). 
 4. See, e.g., Richard Leighton, Using Daubert-Kumho Gatekeeping to Admit and Ex-
clude Surveys in Lanham Act Advertising and Trademark Cases, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 743 
(2002); Artemio Rivera, Testing the Admissibility of Trademark Surveys after Daubert, 84 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 661 (2002). 
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construction in torts, 6 and bankruptcy law.7 States have been consid-
ering whether their evidence codes should be consistent with the ap-
proach articulated by the United States Supreme Court, 8 which con-
cluded that admissible scientific testimony must be grounded in the 
scientific method and based on more than subjective belief and un-
supported speculation.9 
 Among the state courts considering this issue, Florida’s Supreme 
Court has taken a particularly provocative approach. The Florida 
Supreme Court stoutly resists adoption of the Federal Rules govern-
ing admissibility of expert testimony,10 preferring the “higher stan-
dard of reliability”11 set forth under the Frye test. 12 The Florida Su-
preme Court’s foray into the field of scientific and technical expertise 
in its three opinions in Ramirez v. State13 dealt with testimony based 
on a novel approach to matching the marks left by a knife on the 
murder victim’s chest cartilage with a knife found in the defendant’s 
                                                                                                                  
 5. See, e.g., Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Assessment of the Commonsense Psychology 
Underlying Daubert: Legal Decision Makers’ Abilities to Evaluate Expert Evidence in Ho s-
tile Work Environment Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 180 (2002). 
 6. See, e.g., Mortimer N. Moore, A Daubert Challenge to Accident Reconstruction, 50 
R.I. B.J. 11 (Jan./Feb. 2002).  
 7. See, e.g., Michael G. Williamson, Daubert in Bankruptcy Practice: Dispelling Some 
Common but Questionable Working Assumptions, 2002 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 233. 
 8. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 9. Id. at 590. 
The adjective “scientific” implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of 
science. Similarly, the word “knowledge” connotes more than subjective belief 
or unsupported speculation. The term “applies to any body of known facts or to 
any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good 
grounds.”  
Id. at 590 (citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)). 
 10. FED. R. EVID. 702. Testimony by Experts. 
 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness quali-
fied as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may 
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) testimony is based 
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable princi-
ples and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.  
 11. Ramirez v. State (Ramirez III), 810 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]his Court has 
continued to use the Frye test when evaluating novel scientific evidence proposed by the 
State even though the United States Supreme Court, in a civil case, has adopted a differ-
ent rule.”); Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) (“Despite the federal adoption 
of a more lenient standard in [Daubert], we have maintained the higher standard of reli-
ability as dictated by Frye.”). 
 Whether the standard articulated in Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), is more lenient, is 
subject to question. See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
 12. In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia articulated the “general acceptance test,” saying that the ex-
pert evidence “from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have 
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” 
 13. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 836; Ramirez v. State (Ramirez II), 651 So. 2d 1164 
(Fla. 1995); Ramirez v. State (Ramirez I), 542 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1989). 
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girlfriend’s car.14 The expert testified with “absolute certainty” that 
the found knife was the murder weapon.15 Rejecting the testimony’s 
evidentiary foundation for the third time, the Florida Supreme Court 
simultaneously rejected the federal rule and elaborated an approach 
remarkably similar to that rule, requiring judges to evaluate the sci-
entific basis for novel expert testimony. 
 Ramirez III leaves Florida judges and advocates with two puzzles. 
First, to what expert testimony does Ramirez III apply? The case 
dealt with a novel forensic identification technique and the holding 
might be limited to that context. Florida’s judges might think they 
only have to worry about their own training in science only if a law-
yer offers into evidence a new scientific principle or technical meth-
odology.  
 This Article argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s reasoning 
inexorably requires application of the Ramirez III approach to con-
ventional scientific evidence as well, scientific evidence of a type that 
has already been received in a substantial number of cases. That 
suggests that Florida judges and practitioners in state courts face the 
same travails as those in federal courts who are struggling to deter-
mine whether expert testimony based on such traditionally admissi-
ble techniques as fingerprint identification is admissible.16 Logic and 
precedent dictate that the principles of scientific soundness eventu-
ally will be extended to all expert evidence, whether novel or not. 
 Second, in cases where the approach of Ramirez III is applicable, 
how is the Florida test different from the Federal Rules approach re-
jected by the Florida Supreme Court? The United States Supreme 
Court’s competing “scientific soundness”17 approach was initially pre-
sented in the context of scientific expertise in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.18 and was applied to technical expertise in 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.19 It is now reflected in Rule 702 of the 
                                                                                                                  
 14. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 840-41. 
 15. Id. at 849. 
 16. In United States v. Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 464 (E.D. Pa. 2001), the government 
moved to admit latent print evidence. District Court Judge Pollak held that the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation fingerprint expert could not give opinion testimony that a latent 
fingerprint was that of a particular person, because the fingerprint identification evidence 
was not sufficiently reliable to meet the standards for expert testimony set by Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, as explicated by the Supreme Court in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
579, and reaffirmed in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Then, on peti-
tion for reconsideration, the District Court in United States v. Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 
576 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated its prior opinion and held that expert could give expert opin-
ion consistent with the Daubert decision and federal procedural rules.  
 17. The Florida Supreme Court, in Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 843 n.8, adopted this 
characterization of the approach followed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
 18. 509 U.S. at 579. 
 19. 526 U.S. at 137. 
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Federal Rules of Evidence.20 Does the Florida Supreme Court’s ar-
ticulation of the test for admissibility of novel scientific testimony dif-
fer significantly from that of the United States Supreme Court? This 
Article describes the scientific principles underlying the Federal 
Rules and shows that the Florida Supreme Court has adhered closely 
to the Daubert approach.  
 The lack of clarity about the scope of Ramirez III has misled Flor-
ida courts. For instance, in Jackson v. State, decided a year after 
Ramirez III,21 the appellate court affirmed a district court’s finding 
that expert testimony relying on psychological tests to determine the 
likelihood a violent predator would re-offend was admissible.22 The 
institutionalized appellant argued that the expertise had not been 
subject to the test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence.23 The 
appellate court did not address whether the proffered expertise was 
novel, even though that was the basis of the appellant’s argument. 24 
The court must have believed, however, that the testimony was sci-
entific because it held that the testimony was admissible based on its 
general acceptance in the “relevant scientific community.”25 The court 
referred to no other Florida case accepting such evidence. Its holding 
was based on a citation to a Washington State appellate court deci-
sion.26 In Washington State, however, the Frye rule, rather than the 
Daubert criteria, is used to evaluate novel scientific evidence.27 Ei-
ther the Jackson court did not recognize Florida’s distinction be-
tween novel and conventional evidence or it did not know that Rami-
rez III applied to novel evidence or it did not recognize that Ramirez 
III had created a new standard for novel scientific expertise.28 These 
distinctions and rules are the subject of this Article. 
                                                                                                                  
 20. FED. R. EVID. 702.  
 21. Ramirez III was decided on December 20, 2001. Jackson was decided on December 
26, 2002. 
 22. Jackson v. State, 833 So. 2d 243, 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).  
 23. Id. 
 24. See id.  
 25. Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. (citing State v. Strauss (In re Strauss), 20 P.3d 1022 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(upholding admissibility of testing instruments such as those under consideration in Jack-
son)). 
 27. Strauss, 20 P.3d at 1025 (“Contrary to Strauss’s assertion, it is clear that the Frye 
test applies to civil commitment proceedings, not the test enunciated in [Daubert].”) (cita-
tion omitted); see also Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282 (Wash. 1995) (reaffirming adherence to 
the Frye test when determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence in Washing-
ton courts). 
 28. Florida courts are not alone in failing to apply what this Article shows to be the 
current requirements for admissibility of novel scientific evidence. The leading treatise on 
scientific evidence, 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE : THE LAW 
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 9-1.5, at 420 (2d ed. 2002), states that “no court has 
evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony regarding future violence under the Court’s 
Daubert decision.” While some states modify evidentiary standards in some procedural 
contexts where predictions of violence are relevant, see id. § 9-1.2, at 411, the Florida ap-
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 Other post-Ramirez courts in Florida have continued to distin-
guish between fact-based evidence and opinion-based evidence with-
out reference to the requirements of Ramirez III. The court in Rick-
gauer v. Sarkar relied on the Florida rule that most opinion testi-
mony is not subject to any interpretation of the Frye rule, whether a 
pre- or post-Ramirez III interpretation:  
Most expert testimony is not subject to the Frye test. Pure opinion 
testimony does not have to meet the Frye test because it is based 
on the expert’s personal opinion. We believe that Dr. Sharp’s tes-
timony was pure opinion testimony and did not have to meet the 
Frye test.29  
 In Rickgauer, the expert testified that, based on his own experi-
ence, the defendant physician’s evaluation of the patient was inade-
quate and that the treatment was faulty.30 Because the testimony 
was opinion, not fact, different rules applied.31 In Ramirez III, the 
Florida Supreme Court’s basis for rejecting the expert testimony was 
that the expert’s “determination is entirely subjective and is based on 
the technician’s training and experience.”32 The Rickgauer court did 
not recognize any similarity or any important distinction between 
medical opinion, based on a background of medical school training 
and practice, and the “subjective [evidence] based on training and 
experience,”33 rejected in Ramirez III. The lack of clarity in the law 
may have led the Rickgauer court to conclude that medical opinion is 
either not subjective, in which case it is factual rather than opinion 
testimony34 and subject to the Frye test,  or the court in Rickgauer 
failed to appreciate the scope of Ramirez III.  
 Six months after the Rickgauer opinion, the Florida Supreme 
Court, in United States Sugar Corp. v. Henson,35 addressed the ques-
tion of whether the Frye test, as interpreted by Ramirez III, applied 
to new and novel medical opinion testimony, though in the limited 
context of workers’ compensation cases where there is a statutorily 
                                                                                                                  
pellate court in Jackson did not suggest that it was applying any special rules. See Jack-
son, 833 So. 2d at 246.  
 29. 804 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (citations omitted).  
 30. Id. at 505.  
 31. The court in Rickgauer, 804 So. 2d at 505 n.4, recognized the Florida distinction 
between fact and opinion evidence: 
 A distinction exists between factual evidence or testimony and opinion testi-
mony and as a general rule, factual evidence cannot be rejected unless it is con-
trary to law, improbable, untrustworthy, unreasonable or contradictory. Walls 
v. State, 641 So.2d 381, 390 (Fla. 1994); Brannen v. State, 94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 
429 (1927). Opinion testimony is not subject to the same rule. Walls; Brannen. 
 32. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 836, 847 (Fla. 2001).   
 33. Rickgauer, 804 So. 2d at 505 n.4.   
 34. See id.  
 35. 823 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2002). 
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reduced burden of proof on the plaintiff.36 The court, in Henson, ex-
tended the Ramirez III approach to such opinion testimony, describ-
ing the test as focused “on the general acceptance of the scientific 
principles and methodologies upon which an expert relies in render-
ing his or her opinion.”37 The court reiterated the need for courts to 
“examine expert testimony, scientific and legal writings, and judicial 
opinions in making its determination,”38 and commended the district 
court for its comprehensive and exhaustive inquiry into the method-
ology and scientific principles underlying the testimony.39  
 Unanswered is the policy question of why new and novel medical 
opinion testimony should be subjected to the more rigorous Ramirez 
III standard, while testimony based on conventional medical opinion, 
which has never been scrutinized in detail, should not be reconsid-
ered. This question is implicit in a larger issue discussed in this Arti-
cle, whether conventional as well as novel expert testimony should be 
subject to the Ramirez III test.40  
 On some occasions where Florida courts have recognized the need 
for an expanded hearing to test the reliability of new or novel scien-
tific testimony, the standards of Ramirez III have been confused with 
the earlier Ramirez opinions. Arnold v. State,41 though decided only 
shortly after Ramirez III, remanded for a hearing on the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence, which it described as “new and novel”42 based on 
                                                                                                                  
 36. Id. at 107. 
 37. Id. at 110.  
 38. Id. at 109 (quoting Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 579 (Fla. 1997)). 
 39. Id. Florida appellate courts have recognized the application of Ramirez III to 
novel medical testimony. See State v. Sercey, 825 So. 2d 959, 980 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (stat-
ing this conclusion as a general rule and applying the expanded Frye test). The court in 
Sercey conducted what it described as an “extensive research of the scientific principles” 
underlying the basis for the experts’ new and novel testimony on the effects of marijuana. 
Id. at 984.  
 40. Also unanswered is the question of why pure opinion testimony, which apparently 
has no foundation at all, is admitted without any scrutiny, whether conventional or novel. 
The Florida Supreme Court, in Flanagan v. State, offered this explanation: 
[P]ure opinion testimony, such as an expert’s opinion that a defendant is in-
competent, does not have to meet Frye, because this type of testimony is based 
on the expert’s personal experience and training. While cloaked with the credi-
bility of the expert, this testimony is analyzed by the jury as it analyzes any 
other personal opinion or factual testimony by a witness. [Sex offender profile] 
testimony, on the other hand, by its nature necessarily relies on some scientific 
principle or test, which implies an infallibility not found in pure opinion testi-
mony. The jury will naturally assume that the scientific principles underlying 
the expert’s conclusion are valid. Accordingly, this type of testimony must meet 
the Frye test, designed to ensure that the jury will not be misled by experimen-
tal scientific methods, which may ultimately prove to be unsound. 
625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (citations omitted). Whether this is a sensible distinction is 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 41. 807 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (decided Jan. 30, 2002). 
 42. Id. at 140. 
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the different standards established by Ramirez II,43 an earlier opin-
ion in the same case. Those standards seem to apply a more tradi-
tional Frye-based general acceptance test. 44 It is critical that Florida 
courts and lawyers recognize the distinction between the traditional 
Frye and Ramirez III tests. 
 Part II of this Article focuses on the distinction between the Frye 
and Daubert tests. The history of the development of both the Frye 
and Daubert tests has been well-examined elsewhere.45 Part II also 
presents a brief outline of the Daubert test (Daubert identified four 
(nonexclusive) factors to be considered when evaluating the sound-
ness of expert scientific evidence) and compares it to the language of 
Frye, which was followed in Ramirez II. Part III of this Article de-
scribes in detail the role of those factors in the scientific method, pro-
viding guidance to both judges and lawyers on how to evaluate the 
admissibility of novel scientific evidence in jurisdictions that ac-
knowledge following the approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Part III also traces the parallels between the Daubert factors and the 
Florida Supreme Court’s analysis of the evidence in Ramirez III. It 
concludes that despite the Florida Supreme Court’s denial that it fol-
lows Daubert, all Daubert factors are relevant to admissibility in 
Florida courts and Ramirez III identifies no other relevant factors. 
 Part IV considers whether conventional expert testimony should 
logically be subject to the same standards as novel expert evidence. 
The United States Supreme Court made it clear in Daubert that the 
                                                                                                                  
 43. 651 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 1995). In Ramirez II, the court followed a more traditional 
statement of the applicable test: 
 In utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to 
prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the 
testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand. 
The trial judge has the sole responsibility to determine this question. The gen-
eral acceptance under the Frye test must be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 
Id. at 1168. 
 44. The court in Arnold, 807 So. 2d at 140, stated:    
 The supreme court has set forth a step-by-step analysis that a trial court 
must make before admitting into evidence the testimony of an expert witness 
concerning a new scientific principle. Ramirez II, 651 So. 2d at 1166. A trial 
court must determine whether: (1) expert testimony will assist the jury in un-
derstanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue; (2) the expert’s te s-
timony is based on a scientific principle or discovery that is “sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs” under the Frye test; and (3) the particular expert witness is qualified to 
render an opinion on the subject in issue. Id. If the trial court’s answer to the 
first three questions is in the affirmative, then the expert may testify at trial 
and the jury can assess the expert’s credibility and either accept or reject his or 
her opinion. Id.   
 To compare the Ramirez III standards, see discussion infra Parts II, III. 
 45. A most authoritative and exhaustive discussion of these rules appears in 1 
FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1, at 1-68.  
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principle of scientific soundness applies to new as well as conven-
tional expertise.46 In Ramirez III, the Florida Supreme Court limited 
its holding, as Frye is interpreted as having done,47 to novel expert 
evidence. Its limitation is based on the conclusion that novel exper-
tise is “inherently unreliable.”48 Part IV also considers Florida law re-
lated to admissibility of expert evidence generally, then analyzes 
whether Daubert really is more lenient and whether Frye is a “higher 
standard of reliability” as the Florida Supreme Court claimed in Ra-
mirez III.49 It identifies cases where courts continue to accept scien-
tific expertise of dubious reliability and the status of Florida rules 
governing challenges to that testimony. Finally, it concludes that 
when the reliability of conventional expertise is challenged, the Ra-
mirez III standards should apply. 
II.   FRYE VERSUS DAUBERT 
 To facilitate a comparison of Florida and federal evidence law on 
the admissibility of expert testimony, this Part of the Article briefly 
compares the analytical standards set forth in Ramirez III and 
Daubert. Florida evidence law requires that expert testimony of a 
scientific or technical nature, or based on specialized knowledge, be 
reliable.50 For novel scientific evidence, at least, Florida courts after 
Ramirez III have followed a “Frye-Plus” test for reliability, which re-
quires exclusion of the evidence “unless the theory has been ade-
quately tested and accepted by the relevant scientific community.”51 
The requirement that the theory be “accepted” is derived from Frye v. 
                                                                                                                  
 46. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993) (“Although 
the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on ‘novel’ scientific techniques, we do not read 
the requirements of Rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. 
Of course, well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are 
novel, and they are more handily defended.”).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 836, 843 (Fla. 2001). 
 49. See supra note 11. 
 50. Florida Evidence Code 90.702. Testimony by experts. 
 If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 
may testify about it in the form of an opinion; however, the opinion is admissi-
ble only if it can be applied to evidence at trial. 
FLA.  STAT. § 90.702 (2002). “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by 
law.” FLA. STAT. § 90.402 (2002). According to the Florida Supreme Court:   
Relevant evidence is excluded inter alia if it is unreliable under the balancing 
test in section 90.403: 
90.403 Exclusion of grounds of prejudice or confusion.—Relevant evidence is 
inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence. 
Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 842-43 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2000)). 
 51. See Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 843. 
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United States,52 wherein the Federal Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia held that the principles “must be sufficiently established 
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.”53 The Plus part of the Florida’s Frye-Plus test requires, at 
least, that a novel theory has been adequately54 or sufficiently 55 
tested.  
 To meet the Frye-Plus standard, a trial court “must consider the 
quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence supporting or opposing a 
new scientific technique.”56 Asking experts in the particular field 
whether their own principles are sound is not enough. A “nose count” 
of the experts is not sufficient57 and “counting a majority of the mem-
bers of the relevant scientific community is not controlling.”58 Even 
general acceptance by members of some discipline is not enough 
where the discipline itself lacks reliability.59 Judges must be familiar 
enough with the adequacy and sufficiency of scientific testing to de-
cide what evidence of novel theories or techniques to admit under 
Florida’s Frye-Plus test. 
 The competing “scientific soundness” test from Daubert instructs 
trial judges to be gatekeepers, excluding unreliable testimony by con-
sidering the following four factors (perhaps among others), at least 
where they reasonably shed light on the reliability of the proffered 
evidence: 
—Whether a “theory or technique . . . can be (and has been) 
tested”; 
—Whether it “has been subjected to peer review and publication”; 
—Whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high 
“known or potential rate of error” and whether there are “stan-
dards controlling the technique’s operation”; and 
                                                                                                                  
 52. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 53. Id. at 1014. 
 54. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 843. 
 55. Id. at 843 n.7 (“This standard requires a determination, by the judge, that the ba-
sic underlying principles of scientific evidence have been sufficiently tested and accepted 
by the relevant scientific community.”) (quoting Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 
1997)). 
 56. Id. at 844 n.12 (“Of course, the trial courts, in determining the general acceptance 
issue, must consider the quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence supporting or oppos-
ing a new scientific technique.”) (quoting Brim, 695 So. 2d at 272 (quoting People v. Leahy, 
882 P.2d 321, 336-37 (Cal. 1994))). 
 57. Id. at n.9 (“[A] ‘nose count’ is not alone sufficient to establish general acceptance 
in the scientific community.”) (quoting Brim, 695 So. 2d at 272).  
 58. Id. (“Merely counting a majority of the members of the relevant scientific commu-
nity is not controlling.”) (quoting CHARLES W. EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 702.3 
(perm. ed., rev. vol. 2000)). 
 59. Id. (“Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of [general acceptance] help show 
that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for ex-
ample, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted principles of astrology or 
necromancy.”) (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999)). 
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—Whether the theory or technique enjoys “‘general acceptance’” 
within a “‘relevant scientific community.’”60 
 The United States Supreme Court has recognized that evidence 
necessary to establish reliability varies from one theory or technique 
to another: “Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor 
exclusively applies to all experts or in every case.”61 Thus, the reli-
ability inquiry is designed to be a flexible one.62 Focusing on the four 
Daubert factors, however, facilitates a comparison to the Frye-Plus 
approach articulated in Ramirez III. 
                                                                                                                  
 60. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149-50 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993)). 
 61. Id. at 142. Kumho Tire emphasized that different factors are more or less relevant 
in different cases: 
 Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the reliability of 
which will be at issue in some cases. See, e.g., Brief for Stephen N. Bobo et al. 
as Amici Curiae 23 (stressing the scientific bases of engineering disciplines). In 
other cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowl-
edge or experience. As the Solicitor General points out, there are many differ-
ent kinds of experts, and many different kinds of expertise. See Brief for United 
States as Amicus Curiae 18-19, and n. 5 (citing cases involving experts in drug 
terms, handwriting analysis, criminal modus operandi, land valuation, agricul-
tural practices, railroad procedures, attorney’s fee valuation, and others). Our 
emphasis on the word “may” thus reflects Daubert’s description of the Rule 702 
inquiry as “a flexible one.” 509 U.S., at 594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Daubert makes 
clear that the factors it mentions do not constitute a “definitive checklist or 
test.” Id., at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786. And Daubert adds that the gatekeeping in-
quiry must be “‘tied to the facts’” of a particular “case.” Id., at 591, 113 S.Ct. 
2786 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (C.A.3 1985)). We 
agree with the Solicitor General that “[t]he factors identified in Daubert may or 
may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the is-
sue, the expert’s particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Brief 
for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. The conclusion, in our view, is that we 
can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases and for all time the applicability 
of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we now do so for subsets of cases 
categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too much depends 
upon the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue. 
 Daubert itself is not to the contrary. It made clear that its list of factors was 
meant to be helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessarily 
apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is 
challenged. It might not be surprising in a particular case, for example, that a 
claim made by a scientific witness has never been the subject of peer review, for 
the particular application at issue may never previously have interested any 
scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Daubert’s general accep-
tance factor help show that an expert’s testimony is reliable where the disci-
pline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so -
called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy. 
Id. at 150-51. 
 62. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594; Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997); 
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 141 (“[A]s the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is 
‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to 
all experts or in every case.”).  
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III.   SCIENTIFIC METHOD, THE DAUBERT  FACTORS, AND THE RAMIREZ 
III APPROACH 
 A detailed examination of the Florida Supreme Court’s application 
of its standards for the admissibility of novel expert testimony in this 
Part reveals a striking similarity between the Florida and the federal 
approaches. This Part considers the four Daubert factors and how the 
Florida Supreme Court’s analysis fits within that framework. It 
demonstrates that the analytical structures of the two approaches 
are identical. 
A.   Testability and Tested 
 The United States Supreme Court described “testability” as “a key 
question to be answered in determining whether a theory or tech-
nique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact.”63 Test-
ability is also described as “falsifiability” or “refutability.”64 Testabil-
ity refers to “potential reliability,” whether the theory or technique is 
susceptible to scientific testing of its reliability.65 By any of these de-
scriptions, mere assertions that a technique is reliable are unaccept-
able as a foundation for the admission of expert evidence. By testing, 
the actual reliability of a theory or technique may be evaluated. 
 A typical scientific approach to knowledge assumes that there is 
no relationship between two phenomena (such as taking a drug and 
recovering from an illness) and no validity to a technique (such as 
examining a knife wound and identifying the knife that made the 
wound) until the relationship or validity is established using the sci-
entific method. Testing a theoretical relationship or technique is es-
sential to the scientific method. Some theories, however, are inher-
ently or practically untestable. 
 Professor David Faigman offers an example of an untestable 
proposition from criminology.66 He considers the proposition that 
“punishments imposed by the criminal law reflect society’s ‘conscious 
and unconscious urges.’”67 Every example of criminal punishment fits 
this theory. If punishments are severe, it must be because society 
consciously or subconsciously wants severe punishments. Even if 
everyone denies wanting severe punishment, it must be that subcon-
sciously they really do, but do not understand their subconscious. If 
                                                                                                                  
 63. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 64. See id. (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF 
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed., Routledge 1989) (1962) (“[T]he criterion of the scie n-
tific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.”) (emphasis omit-
ted)).  
 65. See id.   
 66. David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to 
the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1017 (1989). 
 67. Id. (quoting CHARLES SCHOENFELD, PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE LAW 19 (1973)).  
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society adopts more lenient punishments, the theory is neither con-
tradicted nor supported. The conscious urges may have changed or 
the subconscious urges, heretofore repressed, might be taking 
charge. A falsifiable theory is one that can be proved logically wrong 
by at least one statement. There is no way to prove this theory false. 
If untestable, this assertion cannot be considered even potentially re-
liable from a scientific perspective. If a theory is incapable of scien-
tific support, testimony based on the theory is inadmissible.  
 What about the knife identification methodology considered in 
Ramirez III? Is it testable? Has it been tested? Does the Florida Frye-
Plus rule care? The Florida Supreme Court’s description of the tech-
nology in Ramirez III made the methodology seem like a black box 
into which one cannot peer and from which startling results 
emerge.68 According to the expert, there is a match between the 
tested knife and the murder weapon if the marks left by the two 
knives are “sufficiently similar.”69 According to the Florida Supreme 
Court: 
This determination is entirely subjective and is based on the tech-
nician’s training and experience; there is no minimum number of 
matching striations or percentage of agreement or other objective 
criteria that are used in this method. No photographs are made of 
the casts, [the expert explained,] because lay persons and those not 
trained in this procedure would be unable to understand the com-
parison process; similarly, no notes are made describing the basis 
for identification. Once a match is declared under his theory, no 
other knives are examined because an identification under this 
method purportedly eliminates all other knives in the world as 
possible sources of the wound.70 
                                                                                                                  
 68. Even these black box techniques can be tested for reliability. Such testing is com-
mon when establishing the health effects of exposure to drugs or toxic substances. The 
testing does not necessarily involve determining how the drug or toxin works, but rather 
considers whether it produ ces the hypothesized benefit or harm.  
 Such testing has other legal applications. In employment discrimination law, the ques-
tion may be whether an employer’s work force is discriminatorily composed. The plaintiff 
need not establish how the workforce ended up with an under-representation of one ethnic 
group, only that it did end up that way. If proper scientific testing revealed that a vaccine 
prevented polio frequently enough, the beginnings of a proper foundation would have been 
laid for its use. If proper testing revealed that fingerprint experts, handwriting experts, 
hair and fiber experts, or knife identification experts produced correct results frequently 
enough, the secrets of their methodology would be less significant than the results.  
 I do not mean to suggest that there need be no theory explaining the mechanism of a 
drug or no objective criteria underlying conclusions regarding knife identification. General 
acceptance of a theory or technique, a separate factor to consider, may require that the 
black box be opened, or at least that its contents be described. Proper testing of the reli-
ability of a technique may, though need not, require knowledge of the contents. The effi-
cacy of polio vaccine can, for instance, be tested without knowing exactly how the body 
works. 
 69. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 836, 846 (Fla. 2001). 
 70. Id. at 847.  
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 Does this discussion by the Florida Supreme Court reflect a con-
cern with testability and whether a technique has been tested? The 
court concluded that “a team of expert technicians trained by [the 
testifying expert] would be virtually impossible to challenge notwith-
standing the fact that his procedure is untested.”71 The technique is 
neither testable as described by the expert, nor has it been tested. 
According to the court, the fact that the methodology has never been 
formally tested is the first reason why the method failed the Frye 
test. 72 
 From a scientific perspective, testability and testing are essential 
elements of the scientific method. Testing separates knowledge from 
speculation. Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Ex-
pert Testimony73 is the leading treatise on scientific evidence. With 
respect to the testing factor, the authors conclude: 
In fact, courts will find application of Daubert difficult if they treat 
testability as an optional factor. The other three factors all pre-
suppose testability; in science, a non-testable hypothesis cannot 
have an error rate and is exceedingly unlikely to be published in a 
peer-reviewed journal and achieve general acceptance. And indeed, 
since Daubert, courts generally appear to treat testability as a pre-
requisite rather than just another factor.74 
The Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Frye rule appears 
to be in agreement with this proposition in that it ranks testing as 
the first of its concerns with respect to the lack of reliability of novel 
evidence.75 
B.   Peer Review and Publication 
 The United States Supreme Court has described peer review as a 
“relevant” factor and publication as “an element” of peer review.76 
Scientific publications require review by the peers of people submit-
ting articles. Survival of the submission and review process is an in-
dication that a theory or technique has been objectively evaluated by 
persons familiar with the scientific method. Such scrutiny “increases 
the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be de-
tected.”77 
 Unlike testability and scientific testing, peer review and publica-
tion are not essential elements. 78 Flaws in the peer review system 
                                                                                                                  
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 849. 
 73. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28. 
 74. Id. § 1-3.4.1, at 28-29.   
 75. See Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 849.   
 76. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. (stating that peer review is “relevant” and is a “pertinent consideration”).  
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and varying standards among scientific journals mean that publica-
tion does not necessarily correlate with reliability. And, as the 
United States Supreme Court observed, well-grounded but innova-
tive theories might not have been published, especially if the under-
lying theories are “too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to 
be published.”79 Publication is, therefore, a relevant but not disposi-
tive factor under Daubert.80 
 Under the Frye-Plus test articulated by the Florida Supreme 
Court in Ramirez III, the second reason why the knife identification 
testimony was inadmissible was because “the record does not show 
that [the expert’s] test has ever been subjected to meaningful peer 
review or publication as a prerequisite to scientific acceptance.”81 The 
court examined two groups of publications, North American publica-
tions and European publications. The North American publications 
did not undertake “the kind of searching, critical review that is the 
sine qua non of scientific acceptance.”82 The European articles ad-
dressed only conventional knife-mark theory, rather than this ex-
pert’s approach, and none supported the expert’s claim that knife-
mark identification techniques could identify a knife with absolute 
certainty.83  
 Ramirez III creates a precedent for courts in Florida to do more 
than simply consider whether others have published articles support-
ing the theory. The Florida Supreme Court evaluated the quality of 
the published support and rejected the North American studies be-
cause they were insufficiently critical, detailed, or scientific.84 The 
                                                                                                                  
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 836, 849 (Fla. 2001). 
 82. Id. at 850 n.39 (explaining that “the North American articles [were] brief,” con-
taining “only a page or two of text,” were “uncritical,” and were “limited to a single anecdo-
tal study”). 
 83. Id. at 850-51.  
 84. The court in Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 849-50 n.35 cited several studies:  
 See J.I. Galan, Identification of a Knife Wound in Bone, 18 Ass’n Firearm & 
Toolmark Examiners J. (Oct.1986) (finding a positive match between the sus-
pected knife, i.e., a KA-BAR kitchen knife with a well-worn fourteen-inch blade, 
and a wound in the victim’s rib bone based on gross and fine striae; with pho-
tos); Valerie Rao and Robert Hart, Tool Mark Determination in Cartilage of 
Stabbing Victim, 28 J. Forensic Sci. 794, 798 (1983) (finding a match “within 
reasonable scientific certainty” between the suspected knife, i.e., a marine sur-
vival knife with a cross guard, a serrated blunt edge, a sharp edge, and visible 
defects on the blade, and a wound in the victim’s cartilage based on fine and 
coarse striae arising from class and individual characteristics and supported by 
two “cross guard” abrasions in the skin surrounding the wound; with photos); 
Y.J. Tuira, Tire Stabbing with Consecutively Manufactured Knives, 14 Ass’n of 
Firearm & Toolmark Examiners J. (Jan.1982) (concluding that two consecu-
tively manufactured Buck knives left different microscopic marks when used to 
stab an automobile tire; with photos); Donald J. Watson, The Identification of 
Tool Marks Produced from Consecutively Manufactured Knife Blades in Soft 
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court also evaluated the relevance of the published support and re-
jected the European studies because they did not relate to the tech-
nique being proposed and did not support the expert’s conclusions. 85 
Any Florida judge or lawyer believing he or she can avoid under-
standing the scientific method must be made uncomfortable by the 
court’s articulation of a judicial obligation to test the quality of peer 
review under the Frye-Plus test. 
C.   Error Rate 
 The scientific method consists of forming and testing hypotheses. 
In science, a null hypothesis is a statement of the underlying as-
sumption that there is no relationship between the phenomena or no 
validity to a technique. Even if a technique appears to produce pre-
dictable outcomes (such as a cured disease or a correct knife identifi-
cation), the appearance may be misleading. Your astrologer may find 
the stars aligned perfectly for you to make a serious commitment to 
technology stocks today and your investment may pay off, but the 
scientific method assumes that there is no connection between your 
controlling stars’ alignment and investment success until other plau-
sible explanations are eliminated.  
 In the astrology example, the most obvious alternative explana-
tion to the assertion that humans can predict financial consequences 
by examining the alignment of stars is that chance explains astrolo-
gers’ successes. (Another explanation may be that recipients of the 
predictions only remember the correct advice and forget the predic-
tions that do not come true.) A well-structured scientific experiment 
might be designed to test whether the astrologer’s technique pro-
duced reliable predictions. If the astrologer made too many errors, 
chance, rather than star-reading ability, may be the explanation for 
the occasional success.  
                                                                                                                  
Plastics, 10 Ass’n Firearm & Toolmark Examiners J. (Sept.1978) (concluding 
that two consecutively manufactured Buck knives left different microscopic 
marks when used to cut soft plastic; with photos).  
 85. The court in Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 850 n.36, also cited several German studies:  
 See Wolfgang Bonte, Tool Marks in Bones and Cartilage, 20 J. Forensic Sci. 
315 (1975) (concluding that class and individual characteristics of specially 
ground knives can be determined from wounds in cartilage; with photos); Kyrill 
Bosch, On Stabbing and Cutting Wounds from Knives with Serrated Blades, 54 
German J. Forensic Med. (1973) (translation in present record) (conducting 
stab wounds in various mediums with various knives and concluding that sev-
eral characteristics of the knife can be deduced from the nature of the corre-
sponding wound; with photos); Wolfgang Bonte, Considerations on the Identifi-
cation of Notch Traces from Stabbing Injuries, 149 Arch-Kriminal 77 
(March-April 1972) (translation in present record) (conducting stab wounds in 
human cartilage with twelve different styles of serrated-blade knives and con-
cluding that each blade left characteristic marks; with photos). 
318  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:303 
 
 Statistical methods are used to calculate the probability that 
chance is so likely to be the explanation that we cannot accept the re-
liability of astrology. Perhaps to their dismay, judges in federal 
courts, and those of the twenty-one states that have accepted 
Daubert,86 must be conversant with the details of scientific testing 
and inferential statistical analysis. The United States Supreme 
Court held that “in the case of a particular scientific technique, the 
court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error . 
. . and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation.”87 Understanding the role of the error rate in 
reliability has three aspects: (1) appreciating the practical signifi-
cance of a quantified statement regarding the likelihood of error; (2) 
interpreting the statistical significance of that measured error rate; 
and (3) evaluating the quality of the scientific method underlying the 
measurement. Each of these is discussed separately in this Part. 
1.   Error Rates: Practical Significance 
 There are two relevant aspects to error rate. The first is a sum-
mary measure of how consistent and strong the theory is in correctly 
predicting outcomes. Testing of fingerprint identification methods 
may show that technicians correctly match the print to the individ-
ual sixty percent of the time. This success rate is often described as 
one measure of the practical significance88 of the test. Whether this 
success rate is high enough for the evidence to be admissible and ul-
timately for the fact-finder is a question in the first instance for the 
court.  
 The second aspect of error rate is a measure of whether the test is 
designed to distinguish between the reliability of the technique and 
other reasons for success. If crime lab technicians are only given 
prints from people about whom there is other strong evidence of 
guilt, it may be the investigators’ other evidence, rather than the re-
                                                                                                                  
 86. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1-3.0 n.8, at 12-13 (listing twenty-one states 
that accept the essential principals of Daubert; seven states that “have stated their ope n-
ness to reconsidering the rule they apply to scientific evidence”; ten states, including Flor-
ida, that have stated their preference for Frye over Daubert; seven states and the District 
of Columbia that follow their own approaches; and five states that are undecided). 
 87. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations omit-
ted).  
 88. For a discussion of practical significance, see DAVID W. BARNES & JOHN M. 
CONLEY, STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION: METHODOLOGY, PROCEDURE, AND 
PRACTICE § 1.14, at 34-35 (1986) (“For a finding to be practically significant, it must have 
some influence on a legal decisionmaker faced with a choice among alternative explana-
tions for the event. . . . Practical significance is thus that magnitude of disparity or that 
degree of correspondence that will be persuasive to a decisionmaker.”). 
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liability of the technique, that accounts for successes. 89 Scientific 
studies are typically designed to produce both the first and second 
measures of error. 
 Courts permit experts to testify that a particular knife could have 
been the murder weapon, is consistent with the victim’s wounds, that 
the wounds were caused by the particular knife or a similar one, and 
that the victim’s wounds could not have been caused by a particular 
knife.90 These conclusions are similar to testimony regarding practi-
cal significance. They lack any statement about the accuracy of any 
inference from the testimony. Without accompanying testimony 
about the probability that a knife was or was not the murder weapon, 
how reliable is the testimony that the wounds could have or could not 
have been caused by the murder weapon? A fact finder would proba-
bly give little weight to an eyewitness’s statement that the defendant 
could have been the perpetrator. That eyewitness would probably 
never be put on the witness stand. The reliability of an expert, to 
whom a jury is likely to give greater deference,91 should be given even 
greater scrutiny. 
 The expert, and perhaps even the eyewitness, is likely to testify to 
more than simply the conclusion. If either gives the basis for the con-
clusion, the evidence appears to be more reliable. But this appear-
ance may also be deceiving. Knife, handwriting, or fingerprint identi-
fication experts describe in detail the similarity between the sample 
and the victim’s wounds in terms of striations (for knives), loops and 
spacing (for handwriting), or swirls (for fingerprints). Without know-
ing how common such striations, loops, or swirls are generally, there 
is no way to evaluate how much weight the evidence deserves or 
whether it is more misleading than helpful to the fact-finder. Testi-
mony as to similarity or difference without comparison to the general 
population of knives, handwriting styles, or fingerprint resembles the 
eyewitness saying: “It could have been the defendant because the de-
fendant and the perpetrator were both men.” Until we know that 
about half the population at the time and place of the incident were 
men, we have no measure of how helpful that testimony is to the 
jury.  
 The scientific method requires more of expert witnesses than tes-
timony without a measure of the reliability of inferences to be drawn. 
                                                                                                                  
 89. See generally D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Ob-
server Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. 
L. REV. 1 (2002). 
 90. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 846. 
 91. See id. at 844 (“The trustworthiness of expert scientific testimony is especially 
important because oftentimes ‘[t]he jury will naturally assume that the scientific principles 
underlying the expert’s conclusion are valid.’”) (quoting Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 
828 (Fla. 1993)).  
320  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:303 
 
The knife identification technique evaluated in Ramirez III was 
based on the unproven “premise that every knife blade is unique due 
to microscopic imperfections in the steel caused by the manufactur-
ing process.”92 There is no way to judge the reliability of such testi-
mony, no way to evaluate the value of inferences drawn from the 
bare conclusion that the particular knife was the murder weapon or 
even more detailed testimony that the striations were similar with-
out scientific evidence of the frequency with which striations like 
those appear in knives. 
2.   Error Rates: Statistical Significance 
 The gold standard for experimental testing that will yield an error 
rate measuring reliability is the randomized, controlled, double-
masked study. This standard avoids a wide variety of errors to which 
experimental testing is vulnerable. Because the effect of many of 
these errors cannot be quantified by statistical significance testing, 
these errors fall into the category of potential errors. It is worthwhile 
to explain briefly the errors that may result from ignoring each of 
these three characteristics of a well-designed study because Ramirez 
III indicates the necessity of evaluating the quality of empirical sup-
port of a theory or technique.  
 The keys to quantifying the error rate are randomness and statis-
tical significance testing. Aside from measuring and summarizing in-
teresting outcomes of a study (descriptive statistics), statistical 
analysis promotes scientific inquiry in two ways. First, it guides ana-
lysts in drawing inferences from those outcomes (inferential statis-
tics). Second, and most important for error rates, it provides meas-
ures of the likelihood that an observed relationship posited by a the-
ory or an identification produced by a technique is due to happen-
stance, the luck of the draw, or chance (significance testing).  
 Randomization may be the most familiar element of study design. 
If an expert asserts that the predictions of astrology are due to 
chance, a randomized study’s design must ensure that all predictions 
made by a particular method or a random sample of these predictions 
are evaluated, not just those (perhaps mostly correct predictions) the 
recipient of astrological advice remembers. A friend of mine believes 
that she can consistently win at blackjack, but I suspect she only re-
members the good times. A test for the efficacy of a polio vaccine, 
since polio is a disease that is contagious and (oddly) more prevalent 
                                                                                                                  
 92. Id. at 846; see also D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience 
in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21, 39 
(1996) (observing that uniqueness is not a scientific concept, given that no two things can 
ever be exactly alike, but that science is concerned with perceivable differences and simi-
larities that can be used to assess common origin).  
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among children who live in hygienic surroundings, must involve 
comparison groups of children who are equally interactive with oth-
ers who have been exposed to the disease and who come equally from 
hygienic and unsanitary conditions. A randomized test for knife iden-
tification must include knives that are and are not the murder 
weapon. Note that the randomization requirement does not mean 
that the technician must be given an assortment of knives each time 
he or she makes an identification in practice. It means that when the 
technique is evaluated for its reliability in producing correct out-
comes, the evaluation must not be loaded in favor of a particular re-
sult. 93 
 Statistical analysis of a randomized test that is perfectly designed 
according to the other gold standard criteria yields an error rate that 
measures the likelihood that the technique’s apparent success in 
making correct identifications (or the vaccine’s apparent effective-
ness in preventing polio) is due to chance. This is referred to as sam-
pling error,94 to distinguish it from other sources of error described 
below. The randomization process is part of the study design that 
eliminates the influence of other confounding influences.  
 This sampling error is usually presented as a fraction (often a 
decimal fraction) between zero and one. This fraction is called a p-
value95 and measures the statistical significance96 of the summary 
                                                                                                                  
 93. Many sources of error, including many that are not quantifiable, are discussed in 
David W. Barnes, Too Many Probabilities: Statistical Evidence of Tort Causation, 64 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 191 (2001). 
 94. For a discussion of “sampling error,” as compared to other kinds of error that re-
sults from designing and carrying out experiments, see id. at 198-205. 
 The sampling error probability refers to a statistical property of data under-
lying evidence offered to prove a relevant fact, such as the connection between 
the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s harm. Statistics used to prove causation 
are typically derived from a study of the relationship between acts like the de-
fendant’s and harms like the plaintiff’s. Such a study is typically based on a 
sample, because of the literal and practical impossibility of measuring the ef-
fect of that act on all living human beings. Studying only a sample inevitably 
gives rise to the possibility that the sample chosen is atypical of a larger group, 
the population represented by the sample. 
Id. at 193. See also BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 88, § 6.16, at 287 (“[Sampling error] 
does not refer to all types of errors made in the course of sampling, such as incorrectly 
reading a measurement. Sampling error is inevitably associated with any sample size that 
is smaller than the entire population . . . .”). 
 95. See BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 88, § 1.13, at 33 (“The calculation of the p-
value provides a means of quantifying the probability that an observed discrepancy or rela-
tionship is attributable to chance . . . .”); Barnes, supra note 93, at 198 (“Statisticians use 
the ‘p-value’ to measure the sampling error probability, which is the probability that the 
observed relationship is due to the unrepresentative nature of the randomly selected sub-
jects studied, rather than characteristic of the population from which they were drawn.”). 
 96. See BARNES & CONLEY, supra note 88, § 1.13, at 33 (“When the statistical analysis 
yields a p-value that is less than the predetermined criterion, the results are deemed sta-
tistically significant. If the results are not statistically significant, they are rejected be-
cause of the unacceptably high probability that they occurred as a matter of chance.”). 
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measure of success. If a test shows that knife identification techni-
cians correctly identify the murder weapon 98% of the time (the 
summary measure of success), then 98% is the success rate and 2% is 
the failure rate. The failure rate is first evaluated for its practical 
significance (whether it is too high to be reliable). Sampling error is 
one measure of the reliability of the error rate. A p-value of .38, for 
instance, means that 38% of such tests will yield such impressive 
success rates (or small failure rates) even if there is no legitimate ba-
sis for the identification technique. That 38% figure measures the 
likelihood that good fortune was smiling on the technicians in this 
test. The higher the p-value, the higher the probability that the ap-
parent success was due to chance. Scientists evaluating the statisti-
cal significance of a summary measure traditionally require a p-
value of .05 or less before concluding that chance is unlikely to be the 
explanation for the success. 97 When proper study design eliminates 
all other explanations, and statistical significance testing eliminates 
chance as an explanation, the reliability of the technique is the re-
maining explanation for the success. 
3.   Error Rate and Study Design 
 An important aspect of a controlled study is that it is designed to 
eliminate explanations other than chance for the success of the ex-
periment. If an expert claims that a technique can identify the au-
thor of a particular document, the test must include some documents 
that were and some that were not written by the purported author.98 
Tests of the effectiveness of polio vaccine must include a group of 
children who get the vaccine and a control group that does not. If a 
study is not controlled, it is difficult to tell whether the results of the 
test (rate of correct identification, effectiveness of vaccine) are due to 
the methodology or some other variable. The sampling error meas-
ured by statistical significance testing does not also measure the ef-
fect of improper control on the error rate. For the error rate to be re-
liable, the study must involve proper control.   
 A double-masked (formerly double blind) study ensures that no 
bias is introduced into the test by predispositions or foreknowledge of 
those either administering or subject to the testing. Physicians who 
know which subjects have been gargling with Listerine may (perhaps 
                                                                                                                  
 97. While a p-value of .05 or less is a conventional measure, it is sensible to think of 
using different thresholds for different purposes. Where the harm associated with errone-
ously concluding that there is an association between two variables is small, a larger sam-
pling error may be acceptable. There is no magical significance to the .05 figure. See Bar-
nes, supra note 93, at 198-99 (arguing that the purpose of the scientific investigation af-
fects the appropriateness of a given p-value). 
 98. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in 3 FAIGMAN ET 
AL., supra note 28, § 28, at 400-83. 
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subconsciously) be predisposed to incorrectly interpreting those sub-
jects’ apparent gingivitis as being due to something else. Subjects 
who know they are not getting the real Listerine may not gargle as 
regularly. Neither experimenter nor subject must know who is get-
ting the polio vaccine. Neither the person handing over the test 
knives nor the technician may have any external clues (such as hints 
by police investigators) as to which knife is the murder weapon. 
Again, the sampling error measured by statistical significance test-
ing does not measure the error introduced by the conscious and sub-
conscious bias created by lack of masking. For a reported error rate 
to be reliable, it must have been calculated from a properly controlled 
and unbiased study and be statistically significant. 
4.   Error Rate and Frye-Plus 
 Do Florida judges and lawyers need to worry about these arcane 
and technical research design issues after Ramirez III? There had 
been no testing of the expert’s methodology in Ramirez III,99 so there 
was no in-depth inquiry about the adequacy of the testing. There 
was, however, reference to a single experiment in which a German 
forensic scientist examined cartilage wounds made by twelve grossly 
different types of serrate-blade knives. 100 The Florida Supreme 
Court’s first objection to this test was that the test was not “blind.”101 
In addition, the German study was not designed to determine 
whether there were microscopic differences between knives of the 
same type due to manufacturing, which was the key to the expert’s 
methodology.102 As a result, the German study was not controlling 
the experiment to produce results by which the reliability of the 
technique could be proven.103 There were, accordingly, no error rates. 
The expert simply claimed that his technique was infallible.104  
 In Ramirez II, the court also referred to a holding by the First 
District Court of Appeal, which rejected expert testimony based on 
an uncontrolled experiment. 105 Experimental design appears to be yet 
another skill with which Florida judges and lawyers must become 
familiar. 
                                                                                                                  
 99. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 836, 849 (Fla. 2001) (“[T]he record does not show that [the 
expert’s] methodology—and particularly his claim of infallibility—has ever been formally 
tested or otherwise verified.”). 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. See id.  
 104. Id. at 851 (“[T]he State’s experts testified that the method is infallible, that it is 
impossible to make a false positive identification.”). 
 105. Ramirez II, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Copeland v. State, 566 So. 
2d 856, 858 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)).  
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D.   General Acceptance by the Relevant Scientific Community 
 Daubert finally considers whether the theory or technique is gen-
erally accepted.  
A “reliability assessment does not require, although it does permit, 
explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an 
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within 
that community.” Widespread acceptance can be an important fac-
tor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a known tech-
nique which has been able to attract only minimal support within 
the community” may properly be viewed with skepticism.106  
There can be no question that general acceptance is the heart of the 
Frye test and is relevant after Ramirez III, in which the court said: 
“Finally, the record contains no written authority—including [the 
expert’s] own published article—that upholds his current methodol-
ogy.”107  
 For novel expertise, all of the Daubert factors appear relevant in 
Florida after Ramirez III. Neither the Federal Rules nor Ramirez III 
requires discussion of all the elements.108 Neither the Federal Rules 
nor Daubert and its progeny required any factors that the Florida 
Supreme Court did not consider. Nor did Ramirez III suggest any 
factors the Federal Rules do not permit. Ramirez III characterizes 
these scientific reliability factors as “hallmarks of acceptability.”109 
The United States Supreme Court characterizes them as characteris-
tics of “scientific knowledge.”110 The end result appears to be the 
same. 
IV.   CONVENTIONAL THEORIES AND TECHNIQUES: FRYE OR FRYE-
PLUS? 
 The analytical approach of Ramirez III is explicitly limited to 
novel expertise. Part IV examines the appropriate test to be applied 
                                                                                                                  
 106. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993) (citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d. Cir. 1985)). 
 107. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 851. 
 108. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1999), the United States 
Supreme Court concluded that: 
[A] trial court may consider one or more of the more specific factors that 
Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testimony’s reliabil-
ity. But, as the Court stated in Daubert, the test of reliability is “flexible,” and 
Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all 
experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad 
latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to 
its ultimate reliability determination. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 
U.S. 136, 143, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (courts of appeals are to 
apply “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing district court’s reliability 
determination). 
 109. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 844.   
 110. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
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to conventional theories and techniques. Part IV.A describes the gen-
eral Florida rules defining what evidence is legally and scientifically 
reliable. It compares state and federal approaches to novel and con-
ventional evidence. Part IV.B compares the relative rigor of the Frye 
and Daubert tests, asking whether it is true, as asserted by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, that Daubert is more lenient. Part IV.C considers 
whether the Florida general acceptance test successfully excludes ex-
pertise with no scientific foundation. This Part concludes that when 
the soundness of traditional evidence is challenged, the Ramirez III 
standard should be applied to test the admissibility of that evidence. 
A.   Reliability 
 The Florida Supreme Court recognizes a distinction between “le-
gal reliability” and “scientific reliability.”111 Evidence is legally unre-
liable “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”112 Section 90.403 of 
the Florida Evidence Code is not limited to novel evidence. Nor would 
it be sensible to admit prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or cumula-
tive evidence just because it has been admitted before. According to 
Ramirez III, the issue of scientific reliability arises when there is a 
novel assertion of scientific or technical expertise: 
When a court is faced with expert testimony based on a new or un-
tried scientific theory, however, the balancing test in section 
90.403 is inapposite because the court may be unable to gauge ac-
curately the danger of misleading or confusing the jury due to the 
unproven nature of the testimony. In such a case, “scientific” reli-
ability must be established as a predicate to “legal” reliability.113 
 Is scientific reliability ever relevant to traditionally accepted, that 
is, old and tried, evidence, or is general acceptance the only test? 
There may be old and tried theories that are not generally accepted 
by the relevant scientific community (note the emphasis on scien-
tific). It may also be that, with a better understanding of what expert 
testimony may be misleading to juries, some theories or techniques 
traditionally accepted by Florida courts would not pass the Ramirez 
III, Frye-Plus test.  
 The Florida Supreme Court’s distinction between novel and con-
ventional expertise is based on its observation that novel expertise is 
“inherently unreliable.”114 Non-novel theories may not be inherently 
unreliable, but still unreliable. Can the admissibility of traditionally 
                                                                                                                  
 111. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 842. 
 112. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2000)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 843. 
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admissible, generally accepted but scientifically dubious evidence be 
challenged? The Florida Supreme Court stated in Brim v. State that 
the standard of reliability dictated by Frye is indeed higher than the 
“more lenient” standard in Daubert.115 Can traditionally admissible 
but scientifically unreliable expertise be challenged? 
 Federal courts and state courts following the Daubert approach to 
admissibility of scientific and technical expertise have answered this 
question in the affirmative. They have begun to question evidence 
traditionally considered reliable. The United States Supreme Court 
opened the door for this scrutiny in Daubert, stating: 
 Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on “novel” 
scientific techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 
to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of 
course, well-established propositions are less likely to be chal-
lenged than those that are novel, and they are more handily de-
fended. Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as to have 
attained the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thermody-
namics, properly are subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule 
of Evidence 201.116 
It is now widely recognized that the federal rule may require recon-
sideration of evidence that has long been admitted under the Frye 
test. 117 Does broad application of Federal Rule 702 mean that Frye, 
rather than Daubert, is the more lenient rule? Does traditionally 
admissible evidence skate around the scientific screen in Florida? 
B.   Relative Rigor of Frye and Daubert 
 Frye may be more rigorous than Daubert because it rejects new 
theories and techniques until they are generally accepted. The scien-
tific rigor of the general acceptance test depends on the scientific 
rigor of the community supporting the theory or technique. If both 
the judge and the scientific community believe the approach has a 
strong scientific foundation, that is more rigorous than just relying 
on the judge—as Daubert appears to do, though general acceptance is 
one of the Daubert factors. Thus, Daubert might admit novel evi-
dence that Frye would exclude. 
                                                                                                                  
 115. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997). 
 116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993). 
 117. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 554 (D. Md. 2002). 
 Following the Kumho Tire decision and the December 2000 changes to Rule 
702, a detailed analysis of the factual sufficiency and reliability of the method-
ology underlying expert testimony is required for all scientific, technical or spe-
cialized evidence, not just “novel scientific” evidence. This has required, at 
times, a reexamination of the admissibility of evidence that long has been ad-
mitted under the Frye test, which may result in exclusion of evidence that for 
years routinely has been admitted. 
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 The standard response to assertions of Frye’s greater rigor is that 
Frye admits some evidence that Daubert rejects. A typical example of 
this response appears in the 2002 edition of Modern Scientific Evi-
dence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony.118 The authors in-
clude in their discussion a table resembling Table 1:119 


























The standard application of Frye excludes evidence where general ac-
ceptance is low. Where general acceptance is low and the scientific 
foundation is strong, Frye excludes while Daubert admits. This is the 
basis for the claim that the Frye standard is higher. But where the 
scientific foundation is weak and general acceptance is high, Daubert 
excludes while Frye admits. This is the basis for the claim that 
Daubert is a higher standard. 
 Which standard is preferable undoubtedly depends on the an-
swers given to several questions. First, are there many cases where 
the scientific foundation for a theory or technique is strong but there 
is no general acceptance? Discussing peer review and publication 
rather than general acceptance, the United States Supreme Court 
observed that well-grounded but innovative theories might not have 
been published, especially if the underlying theories are “too particu-
lar, too new, or of too limited interest to be published.”120 If the num-
ber of such theories with legal relevance is great, application of Frye 
would exclude a significant amount of evidence that would “assist the 
trier of fact . . . in determining a fact in issue,” contrary to the dic-
tates of Florida Evidence Rule 90-702.  
 The Frye-Plus rule articulated in Ramirez III addresses the prob-
lem of excluding scientifically sound novel theories by subjecting 
them to a scientific reliability test. As long as Frye-Plus, as applied, 
                                                                                                                  
 118. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1-3.4, at 28.   
 119. Id.  
 120. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citing David F. Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of 
Peer Review and the Suppression of Innovation, 263 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1438 (1990)).  
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does not require general acceptance of a novel and innovative theory 
or technique, Daubert and Frye-Plus are equivalent. Ramirez III does 
not address evidence that is either too particular or of too limited in-
terest to be generally accepted. This might include expertise that is 
not novel. What test should be applied to these cases? 
 Second, how well does general acceptance match strong scientific 
foundation? If there are no generally accepted theories or techniques 
with weak scientific foundations, the apparent superiority of Daubert 
for this set of cases is of no practical significance. But commentators 
identify numerous examples of generally accepted theories and tech-
niques—including handwriting analysis, bite mark identification, 
and fingerprint identification121—that are based on weak scientific 
foundations. Professor Michael Saks and others have pointed out 
that widespread acceptance of techniques with weak foundations 
may lie with the fact that these approaches were first introduced at a 
time when “society was less demanding of proof and more trusting of 
authority.”122  
C.   Rigor in the Florida Courts 
 Some theories with high general acceptance and weak scientific 
support are traditionally accepted in Florida courts. In State v. Hick-
son, for instance, the Florida Supreme Court held that the battered 
woman syndrome theory had gained general acceptance “as a matter 
of law.”123 The court cited thirty other states that have also held evi-
dence based on the syndrome admissible.124 The authors of the 2002 
edition of Modern Scientific Evidence, on the other hand, state that: 
No court or commentator has defended the methodology used to 
develop the syndrome or has suggested that adequate research 
methods were employed in its development. Unfortunately, courts 
have almost uniformly failed to examine in any detail whatsoever, 
the empirical support, or lack thereof, for the battered woman syn-
drome. . . . [T ]he battered woman syndrome remains little more 
than an unsubstantiated hypotheses that, despite being extant for 
over fifteen years, has yet to be tested adequately or has failed to 
be corroborated when adequately tested.125 
                                                                                                                  
 121. 1 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 1-3.7, at 61. 
 122. Michael J. Saks et al., Toward a Model Act for the Prevention and Remedy of Er-
roneous Convictions, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669, 677 n.18 (2001) (referring to the fact that 
“[t]he uniqueness of friction ridge patterns, be they fingerprints, palmprints, or bare foot-
prints, has long been accepted by the scientific community and by the courts”). 
 123. State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 175 (Fla. 1993). 
 124. Id. at 174 n.1. 
 125. 2 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 11-1.5, at 35. 
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There is similar criticism of the scientific foundation for firearms 
identification126 regularly admitted without inquiry into its scientific 
validity in Florida Courts. 127 
 If scientific rigor is a dominant value in Florida evidence law, 
Florida courts must adopt a rule allowing reconsideration of tradi-
tionally accepted evidence under the Frye-Plus test. Correll v. State 
suggests that Florida law is headed in that direction.128 Correll 
states:  
 Thus, we hold that when scientific evidence is to be offered 
which is of the same type that has already been received in a sub-
stantial number of other Florida cases, any inquiry into its reliabil-
ity for purposes of admissibility is only necessary when the oppos-
ing party makes a timely request for such an inquiry supported by 
authorities indicating that there may not be general scientific ac-
ceptance of the technique employed.129 
A party opposing the admission of expert testimony may, therefore, 
challenge that expertise. The standard, consistent with Frye, is def-
erential to authorities discussing whether there is general scientific 
acceptance. Note the inconsistency between this approach to chal-
lenging conventional evidence and the new Ramirez III standards. 
 Ramirez III, decided after Correll, took a large step away from 
deferential general acceptance, though it was in the context of a 
novel technique: 
[T]he court may peruse disparate sources—e.g., expert testimony, 
scientific and legal publications, and judicial opinions—and decide 
for itself whether the theory in issue has been “sufficiently tested 
and accepted by the relevant scientific community.” In gauging ac-
ceptance, the court must look to properties that traditionally in-
here in scientific acceptance for the type of methodology or proce-
dure under review—i.e., “indicia” or “hallmarks” of acceptability.130 
Thus, there is no sensible reason to evaluate conventionally admissi-
ble expertise by any other standard. Correll may set a threshold, 
based on a lack of general acceptance, for deciding when courts may 
                                                                                                                  
 126. 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 28, § 24-9.1, at 174 (stating that “firearms identifi-
cation is so firmly entrenched that is its unlikely that courts will look askance at it, despite 
the fact it would be so rely tried to comply with [the Daubert] criteria (1) [tested and test-
able] and (3) [known error rates]”). 
 127. A selection of such Florida appellate cases considering testimony of firearms iden-
tification experts without examining the scientific foundations for that testimony includes: 
Smolka v. State, 662 So. 2d 1255 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Dixon v. State, 627 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 
2d DCA 1993); State v. Kelley, 588 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Vazquez v. State, 518 
So. 2d 1348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Loren v. State, 518 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); and 
Williams v. State, 468 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). 
 128. 523 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1988).   
 129. Id. at 567.  
 130. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2001). 
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consider an admissibility challenge. Once this threshold proof is met, 
however, the sufficiency of the testing criterion, as applied to novel 
techniques, should be relevant in reconsideration of conventional ex-
pertise as well.  
 General acceptance in Florida is not just a “nose count.”131 It is an 
evaluation in which the court looks for “properties that traditionally 
inhere in scientific acceptance.”132 These properties are those factors 
outlined in Daubert. In Brim v. State, the Florida Supreme Court 
suggested that “general acceptance” meant “acceptance by a clear 
majority of the members of the relevant scientific community.” 133 But 
the court in Brim then quoted the California Supreme Court, which 
had said, “[o]f course, the trial courts, in determining the general ac-
ceptance issue, must consider the quality, as well as quantity, of the 
evidence supporting or opposing a new scientific technique.”134 The 
Florida Supreme Court in Ramirez III adopted this language when 
calling for an evaluation of the factors that indicate whether a theory 
or technique has a strong scientific foundation.135 Although Ramirez 
III is a case involving a novel technique, the theories of general ac-
ceptance developed in Brim and Ramirez III together suggest that 
acceptance by others is no longer the main focus for Florida courts, 
even for traditionally admissible evidence.  
 Expertise with a strong scientific foundation and high acceptance 
is admitted under either Frye or Daubert. Expertise with a weak sci-
entific foundation and low acceptance is excluded under either test. 














                                                                                                                  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1997).  
 134. Id. (quoting People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 336-37 (Cal. 1994)).  
 135. Ramirez III, 810 So. 2d at 844. 
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Admit under Frye 
Exclude if Frye-
Plus applies to re-
considerations 
 
 If the Ramirez III analysis, described on the chart as Frye-Plus, 
means that the proffered expertise, whether novel or conventional 
and being reconsidered, must have a strong scientific foundation, 
then the Florida rule is consistent with the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. While Frye would exclude evidence with a strong scientific 
foundation but low general acceptance, Frye-Plus (and Daubert) 
would admit it. And while Frye would admit evidence with a weak 
scientific foundation but a high general acceptance, Frye-Plus (and 
Daubert) would exclude it. Applying the Frye-Plus approach to recon-
sidered conventional evidence perfectly aligns the Florida and federal 
rules. 
 There is a concern that application of Frye-Plus to conventional 
evidence may open Pandora’s box. In addressing this concern, one 
federal court stated:  
Alarmists may see this as undesirable, envisioning courtrooms 
populated by mad scientists in white lab coats and overzealous 
judges in black robes, busily undoing established precedent. The 
more probable outcome is that judges, lawyers and expert wit-
nesses will have to learn to be comfortable refocusing their think-
ing about the building blocks of what truly makes evidence that is 
beyond the knowledge and experience of lay persons useful to them 
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in resolving disputes. The beneficiaries of this new approach will 
be the jurors that have to decide increasingly complex cases.136 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Ramirez III created new law in Florida for the admissibility of tes-
timonial evidence based on novel theories and techniques. The Flor-
ida Supreme Court maintained that the new rule is different and 
more rigorous than the corresponding federal rule that was derived 
from the United States Supreme Court opinion in Daubert. While do-
ing so, however, the Florida court evaluated the proffered novel ex-
pert testimony using the same factors enunciated in Daubert, substi-
tuting a scientific soundness rule for the general acceptance rule in 
Frye, which had theretofore been the law. Florida judges must hence-
forth apply the standards of scientific rigor to novel admissibility 
questions, asking questions analogous to (1) whether a theory or 
technique is testable and has been tested; (2) whether the results of 
such testing have been subject to peer review; (3) whether error rates 
associated with the technique are known and how great the error 
rate is; and (4) whether the theory or technique is generally accepted 
in the relevant scientific community.137 
 This new rule for novel theories and techniques gives rise to the 
issue of whether scientific evidence of a type that has already been 
received in a substantial number of cases is subject to the same scru-
tiny. It apparently is if there are doubts as to the current acceptabil-
ity of the evidence in the relevant scientific community. Perhaps all 
such evidence should be subject to the test of scientific soundness. If 
it were, Florida courts would face the same broad challenges facing 
federal judges and those in many other Daubert jurisdictions, where 
the reliability of traditionally accepted techniques, such as finger-
print identification, is being questioned.  
 Whether Frye or Daubert is more lenient depends on what kinds 
of evidence are likely to come before the court. If evidence with weak 
scientific foundations but strong general acceptance, or cases with 
weak general acceptance but strong scientific foundations, are com-
mon, the (scientific) reliability of expert testimony will be corre-
spondingly weak under the Frye test because the former will be in-
appropriately admitted and the latter inappropriately excluded. The 
federal (Daubert) rule would exclude the former and admit the latter. 
Daubert is considered more lenient because it will admit evidence 
with a strong scientific foundation even if it is not generally accepted. 
                                                                                                                  
 136. United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 554-55 (D. Md. 2002). 
 137. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999).  
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From a scientific perspective, this admissibility is appropriate. For 
novel evidence, at least, Ramirez III seems to agree.  
 The implications of Ramirez III for scientific evidence of a type 
that has already been received in a substantial number of cases is 
not known. Correll provides precedent for challenging the scientific 
soundness of expert evidence based on theories with declining gen-
eral acceptance. There is also a basis in the Florida Evidence Code 
for applying the scientific soundness principal to all expert testimony 
because the predicate for admissibility is reliability. Whether Florida 
courts will eventually do so is as yet unknown. Combining the les-
sons of Correll and Ramirez III, however, suggests that, when these 
doubts arise, courts should apply the test of scientific soundness. 
 
